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FAMILY TRUSTS AND FEDERAL TAXES*
GEORGE F. JAmEStS-INCE the enactment of the federal income tax in 1913 and the fed-
eral estate tax in 1916, inter vivos private trusts have offered the
major opportunities for minimization of tax burdens on family
wealth. Under any long term plan, income and transfer taxes are reduced
primarily by four means: by taking advantage of all statutory exemp-
tions and deductions, by "splitting" to obtain lower brackets under pro-
gressive rates, by delaying and sometimes ultimately avoiding the realiza-
tion of taxable gain, and by reducing the occasions for the imposition of
tax. Inter vivos trusts of well recognized types, created for other purposes
before 1913, have been used successfully for the past quarter century to
reduce income and transfer taxes by three of these four basic means.'
But for almost a decade there have been ominous signs in the sky, and in
the past two years the scene has changed with startling speed. Uncer-
tainties which always lay a trifle below the surface have emerged and
various dangers are now too apparent to be ignored. The careful counselor
or draftsman must not be content to study the statutory section seemingly
in point on his particular problem and the most recent case in which it has
been construed. Tax law has never been a static field. Both the statutes
and their interpretation have always changed from year to year, and
recently the interrelation of various sections in the statutes has received
increasing notice from the courts. Wise counsel requires a panoramic view
of the internal revenue code, with understanding of the relation of its parts
and of the principles on which taxes are incurred or avoided, and a historic
view of the development of statutory and case law with apparent trends
projected into the future. With such an approach it may be difficult to
offer "guaranteed tax saving plans," but at least illusory certainty can be
avoided. Refraining from unsound advice is also part of the lawyer's task.
To obtain the essential perspective on trusts and taxes, one should look
first at the two revenue measures chiefly involved and at the principles by
which relief from their burdens may be obtained.
* The substance of this paper was delivered as a talk to the University of Chicago Law
School Alumni at Chicago, Illinois, in December, 1941.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
I The fourth, delaying the realization of taxable gain, is usually obtained through incorpora-
tion.
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Because the estate tax is levied upon a taxable event, the transfer
through death of an owner's interest in property, it can be avoided by
decreasing the number of occasions upon which property is transferred by
death or by reducing the amount of property transferred on a particular
occasion. Most simply, the estate tax can be avoided by transferring
property by outright inter vivos gift from a present owner with a short
life expectancy to an object of the owner's bounty whose life expectancy
is longer. An outright gift from husband to wife will often have this effect.
On a gift from a parent to his children the probability of an estate tax sav-
ing is very great. This use of the inter vivos gift has been limited, since
the enactment of the Estate Tax Act in 1916, by the provision that gifts
made or trusts created "in contemplation of death" must be included in
the taxable estate of the donor. But the criteria of "contemplation of
death" are so subjective and the taxpayer's control over sources of evi-
dence so great that this provision has never been highly effective. 3 How-
ever, it has been and still is the only statutory limitation on' the reduction
of estate taxes by absolute inter vivos gift. 4
Why then should trusts be used at all to avoid estate taxes? What are
the advantages of the inter vivos trust over the outright inter vivos gift?
Principally they are two. In the first place, property can be so tied up in
trust that no further transfers are required for two or more generations.
If the owner of property gives part of it to his wife by absolute gift not in
contemplation of death there will be no estate tax as to this property on
the husband's death. The wife may die before the husband, however, and
whenever she dies the property will be taxable in her estate unless she in
turn has disposed of it in her lifetime. If she transfers it to her children,
not in trust, there will be either a gift or an estate tax when they in turn
transfer it to their successors. On the other hand, if the husband had put
the property in trust for his wife for life, then for their children (naming
them) for their lives, with distribution to the next generation fwenty
2"It is apparent that there can be no precise delimitation of the transactions embraced
within the conception of transfers in 'contemplation of death' ..... There is no escape from
the necessity of carefully scrutinizing the ircumstances of each case to detect the dominant
motive of the donor in the light of his bodily and mental condition, and thus give effect to the
manifest purpose of the statute." United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, I19 (1931).
3 See Mr. Justice Stone's dissent in Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 332 (1932).
4 The gift tax is a limitation on the reduction of estate taxes by inter vivos gift only in a very
special sense. The gift tax rate is lower than the estate tax rate; it has a separate basic ex-
emption and the amount given away in life does not affect the rate brackets applicable to the
donor's estate on death. Hence it is still profitable in terms of transfer tax to give away more
than half of a fortune during life.
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years after the death of the last survivor of the children, all intermediate
transfer taxes would have been avoided.5
Important though this advantage may be, another consideration prob-
ably has greater actual weight in most cases. Persons of wealth are natu-
rally somewhat reluctant entirely to surrender the security and power
which their wealth gives them and to turn their property over without
restriction to younger and presumably less wise persons. The inter vivos
trust affords a device by which the owner of property may dispose of it so
far as tax liability is concerned while insuring that it will be used according
to his wishes until the day of his death and beyond. In the words of Mr.
Justice Cardozo, trusts may provide "a continuing exercise by the settlor
of a power to direct the application of the income along predetermined
channels. ' 6 In addition there is at least the hope that some of the econom-
ic power and perhaps a little of the security can be retained by the donor
for the rest of his life. It is primarily against this desire of the donor, the
desire to have his cake and eat it too, that the specific trust provisions in
the estate tax law are directed.
The original estate tax of 1916 included in the gross estate of decedent
all property "to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer, or with respect to which he has created a
trust, in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment at or after his death, except in case of a bona fide sale for a fair con-
sideration in money or money's worth."7 In I924, a second express limita-
tion on the creation of tax avoiding trusts was added, including in the
gross estate property "to the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer, or with respect to which he has
at any time created a trust, where the enjoyment thereof was subject at
the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power, either
by the decedent alone or in conjunction with any person, to alter, amend,
or revoke ....... I On March 3, 1931, transfers by which the transferor
disposes of future interests, retaining enjoyment for his own life, were
expressly included within the gross estate for estate tax purposes. 9 Sub-
ject to clarifying amendments, this is the form of the estate tax today, in-
cluding with property interests of the decedent at his death the subject of
all gifts or trusts theretofore a) created or made in contemplation of death,
b) taking effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death, c) revocable
S Treas.. Reg. 8o, art. ii.
6 Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 67o, 681-82 (i933) . 39 Stat. 777-78 (1917).
a 43 Stat. 304 (1925), 26 U.S.C.A. Int. Rev. Acts 67 (1940).
9 46 Stat. 1516 (i93), 26 U.S.C.A. Int. Rev. Acts 227 (1940).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
or subject to alteration by the grantor alone or with others at the time of
his death, or d) under which a life interest was reserved for the grantor. 0
In the income tax field savings result from the use of trusts primarily by
splitting incomes in order to reduce the maximum tax rates applicable to
each portion. Under the present income tax laws, whenever one member
of the family group has a very large income while that of other members of
the group is substantially smaller, tax savings result from dividing the in-
come more nearly equally, since the maximum surtax brackets applicable
to the entire family income will thus be lowered. While earned income
cannot be so divided," there is no basis under the present statute and
cases for questioning the effect of direct absolute transfers of income-
producing property from a high-income to a low-income member 'of the
group." No trust is necessary to produce this saving. Under some circum-
stances, however, the tax saving can be accentuated by the creation of
trusts. If the total family income is very high, even splitting it equally
among all members of the group may still leave a large part subject to
heavy rates. Moreover, if certain members of the group are children or
young persons, it may be considered inexpedient for various reasons to
give them equal shares in the whole. But since every trust is treated under
the income tax laws as a distinct taxpayer, 3 it is theoretically possible
indefinitely to multiply the number of "taxpayers" in the family unit.
To the extent that the income of each trust is paid out to its beneficiaries
no advantage results from the use of trusts as against direct gifts of capi-
tal. 4 But to the extent that income is accumulated in a large number of
family trusts, the savings resulting from the use of these trusts may be far
greater than could result from the direct gifts.' 5 Moreover, here as under
the estate tax, the natural desire of the settlor is to make an "Indian
gift"'-to dispose of the income for tax purposes with the minimum
'o Int. Rev. Code § 8ii(c), (d), 53 Stat. 121 (i939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 8ii(c), (d) (I94O).
"Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. xIi (193o).
" Blair v. Com'r, 3oo U.S. 5 (1937), distinguished but apparently approved in Helver-
ing v. Horst, 311 U.S. I12 (1940).
3 Int. Rev. Code §§ i6i et seq., 53 Stat. 66 (i939), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 161 et seq. (194o).
'4 Int. Rev. Code § 162, 53 Stat. 66 (939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (1940).
is It is not clear how common such multiplication of trusts to accumulate is in actual prac-
tice. However, one case was brought out in the congressional hearings of the Joint Com-
mittee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance in 1937 in which 64 trusts had been created for the
benefit of four members of an immediate family, Griswold, Cases on Federal Taxation 488
(ig3i); at a press conference on July 3i, 1935, President Roosevelt spoke of one family which
had divided its holdings among 197 separate family trusts, Ratner, American Taxation 471
(1942).
x6 Wales, Indian Gifts, 34 Ill. L. Rev. iig (1939).
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actual change of position. Under the income tax, as under the estate tax,
the specific trust provisions of the act seem designed not to discourage tax
avoidance by trusts under which the settlor effectively and completely
cuts himself loose from the trust corpus, but merely to punish the Indian
who gets too far off the reservation. Hence the law recognizes each dis-
tinct trust as a separate taxpayer, taxable on its accumulated income at
the same rate as an actual person, 7 and provides for taxing the beneficiary
on current income actually disbursed.,' But it further provides for taxing
the settlor on the income of trusts which are revocable by him 9 or the in-
come of which is or may be distributed or accumulated for future dis-
tribution to him or the income from which may be used to pay premiums
on his life insurance. 0
Turning to the cases in which the trust provisions of the income and
estate tax laws have been construed, we find two major periods which
overlap to a considerable extent in time but which can nevertheless be
distinguished. The first was the period in which Congress moved more or
less aggressively to plug gaps in the law and the courts did no more (and
occasionally less) than give effect to reasonably clear congressional in-
tent. In the second period, the courts, particularly the United States Su-
preme Court, began actively to cooperate with the Treasury Department
in carrying out the general scheme and purposes of the revenue code. In
the last few years it may fairly be said that the Court is taking the lead in
opposition to tax avoidance, being prepared in some cases to go further
than Treasury counsel and the Department of Justice had apparently an-
ticipated and considerably beyond anything thai Congress has appeared
explicitly to authorize.
Half a dozen leading cases were sufficient to sustain and largely to give
effect to express congressional limitations on the use of trusts for the
avoidance of taxes. In the early case of Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.
trusts revocable at the will of the settlor alone were held subject to estate
tax as "taking effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death" even
before insertion in the law of a specific section applying the estate tax to
revocable trusts. But in May v. Heiner,2 confirmed in Burnet v. Northern
Trust Co.,23 the Court actually took a step backward. It held that the
reservation of a life estate in a settlor, followed by vested remainders in
17 Int. Rev. Code § i6i(a), 53 Stat. 66 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § I6i(a) (1940).
1T Int. Rev. Code § 162(b), 53 Stat. 66 (i939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(b) (i94o).
19 Int. Rev. Code § 66, 53 Stat. 68 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § i66 (i94o).
20 Int. Rev. Code § 67, 53 Stat. 68 (i939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 67 (1940).
22 278 U.S. 339 (1929). 22 281 U.S. 238 (1930). 23 283 U.S. 782 (1931).
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his children, did not result in a transfer taxable as one "taking effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after death," although the contrary had
very evidently been assumed in Nichols v. Coolidge.24 The day after the
decision in Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., Congress amended the estate tax
act by the joint resolution of March 3, 1931,25 to provide expressly for the
taxation at the death of the settlor of the corpus of a trust as to which the
settlor had reserved the income or use for his own life. It was not until
1938 that a case reached the United States Supreme Court under this
amendment when in Helvering v. Bullard26 its validity was upheld. The
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had held the joint resolu-
tion unconstitutional on the theory that because the transfer was inter
vivos, was presently effective, was irrevocable, and was not made in con-
templation of or intended to be effective at death, Congress was without
power to make it the subject of an estate tax.27 But the Supreme Court
held, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Roberts, that "since Congress may lay
an excise upon gifts it is of no significance that the exaction is denominated
an estate tax or is found in a statute purporting to levy an estate tax.''28
Moreover, Congress, having the right to classify gifts of different sorts,
might impose an excise at one rate upon a gift without reservation of a life
estate and at another rate upon a gift with such reservation. Such a classi-
fication would not be arbitrary or unreasonable. Perhaps the Court's ar-
gument falls a little short of meeting the point in controversy, since the
issue was not merely whether Congress might impose an excise at a special
rate upon a gift with reservation of a life estate but whether this tax might
properly be imposed upon the corpus of an inter vivos gift at its value on
the death of the donor and with the rate dependent upon the amount of
property owned by the donor at the time of his death. The second argu-
ment offered by Mr. Justice Roberts, that the legislative history of the
joint resolution demonstrates that its purpose was to prevent avoidance of
estate taxes and that the reservation of a life estate is a means commonly
used for such tax avoidance, more satisfactorily explains the result.
In Corliss v. Bowers29 the Court upheld Section 219(g) of the Revenue
Act of 1924 specifically including the income of a revocable trust in the
taxable income of its settlor. In accordance with the precise language of
what was then Section 301 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1926, the estate of the
24 274 U.S. 531 (1927).
2546 Stat. i516 (1931), 26 U.S.C.A. Int: Rev. Acts 227 (1940).
26 303 U.S. 297 (1938).
27Bullard v. Com'r, go F. (2d) I44 (C.C.A. 7th 1937).
28 Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U.S. 297, 301 (1938). 29 281 U.S. 376 (1930).
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settlor was held in Porter v. Com'r3° to be taxable upon the corpus of a
trust not strictly revocable but as to which the settlor had retained the
right to amend in various matters, even to the extent of taking property
from the beneficiaries named and transferring it to others, but without the
right to regain the beneficial interest in the property himself. The Court,
in the unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Butler, found that the degree of
control here retained by the settlor was sufficiently great to justify Con-
gress in treating the property as still his for estate tax purposes. In Helver-
ing v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co.31 the Court took its last step in literal
acceptance of the statutory provisions applying the estate tax to the
corpus of revocable trusts. In this case the Court gave literal effect to the
provision of Section 3 02(d) of the Revenue Act of 1926, which included in
the gross estate of the decedent any interest in property of which he had
at any time made a transfer where its enjoyment was subject at the date
of his death to any change through the exercise of a power "either by the
decedent alone or in conjunction with any other person to alter, amend
or revoke"; so that a trust was included for estate tax purposes, although
the decedent's power to revoke or amend had been subject to the ap-
proval of one of the beneficiaries of the trust. This result was somewhat
of a surprise to the bar at the time because the parallel provision of the
income tax law limited the inclusion of trust income in the gross income
of the settlor to situations in which the trust was revocable by the settlor
alone or in conjunction with any person "not having a substantial adverse
interest therein."
The statutory provisions in cases discussed thus far operate on a more
or less consistent theory. Where property is placed in trust without strings
so that the grantor surrenders its immediate benefit, the hope of recover-
ing it, and control over its use and disposition, income from that property
is no longer income of the grantor and the property itself is not prop-
erty of the grantor so as to be subject to transfer tax on his death. Where,
however, the grantor has retained the right to recover the property itself,
or its income, or effective control over its enjoyment, the whole transfer
may not be effective to save either income or estate tax. There were minor
variations in the operation of the two taxes but the principle was fairly
clear.
Even the much discussed case of Helvering v. Hallock32 is no more than a
special and perhaps extreme application of these doctrines. In the Hallock
case it was held that transfers under which the grantor retained until his
death a possibility of reacquiring the corpus of the gift (whether this possi-
30 288 U.S. 436 (1933)- ' 3' 296 U.S. 85 (1935). 32 309 U.S. Jo9 (1940).
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bility should technically be described in terms of property law as a pos-
sibility of reverter, a reversion, a remainder, or a mugwump) left the prop-
erty so transferred subject to tax in the estate of the grantor under Section
811 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code. While this decision may have dis-
dosed an extraordinary willingness on the part of the Court to disregard
its own earlier decisions, it may still be regarded as operating on the In-
dian gift principle, and, if a matter of first impression, would have been a
perfectly reasonable and perhaps the preferable construction of the statu-
tory language involved.
But some time earlier, other lines of cases foreshadowed a quite differ-
ent approach to the taxability of trusts, an approach the ultimate conse-
quences of which are still difficult to evaluate. The first of these extremely
significant cases is Burnet v. Wells.33 In 1924 Congress had added to the
income tax law what is now Section 167(a) (3) of the code, providing that
where any part of the income of a trust is or may be applied to the pay-
ment of premiums upon policies of insurance on the life of the grantor,
such part of the income of the trust shall be included in the gross income
of the grantor. One Frederick B. Wells had created trusts in 1922 which
were irrevocable and were for the purpose of paying the premiums on
policies of insurance on the life of the grantor. The policies of insurance
themselves had been transferred to the trusts and the settlor had no power
of disposition over them. The majority of the Court upheld the statute as
applied to this case. "The meaning of the statute is not doubtful, what-
ever may be said of its validity," the Court stated. 34 Then followed a
rather long opinion by Mr. Justice Cardozo arriving at the conclusion that
the statute was valid as well as dear. The case has been so frequently
cited and in so many connections that careful rereading of the entire opin-
ion is strongly advised. The following excerpts seem particularly signif-
icant:
Insurance for dependents is today in the thought of many a pressing social duty.
Even if not a duty, it is a common item in the family budget, kept up very often at the
cost of painful sacrifice, and abandoned only under dire compulsion. It will be a vain
effort at persuasion to argue to the average man that a trust created by a father to
pay premiums on life policies for the use of sons and daughters is not a benefit to the
one who will have to pay the premiums if the policies are not to lapse. Only by closing
our minds to common modes of thought, to every-day realities, shall we find it in our
power to form another judgment .....
Trusts for the preservation of policies of insurance involve a continuing exercise
by the settlor of a power to direct the application of the income along predetermined
channels. In this they are to be distinguished from trusts where the income of a fund,
though payable to wife or kin, may be expended by the beneficiaries without restraint,
33 289 U.S. 670 (r933). 34 Ibid., at 675.
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may be given away or squandered, the founder of the trust doing nothing to impose
his will upon the use. There is no occasion at this time to mark the applicable principle
for those and other cases ..... 3
It is certainly worth noting that the application of income along pre-
determined channels is no more a feature of insurance trusts than it is of
trusts providing for accumulation. The situation distinguished by Mr.
Justice Cardozo was that in which the income is payable to wife or kin and
may be expended by them without restraint; in other words, the situation
in which the income is taxable under present law to the beneficiary. The
distinction between the trust in the Wells case and the ordinary trust for
accumulation must lie merely in the express language of the statute.
36
And since in this case the settlor had no control whatsoever over the trusts
or over the policies of insurance upon which premiums were to be paid by
the trust, the Indian gift theory in its ordinary form was not applicable.
The possible implications of this case were obviously enormous and be-
came the subject of immediate discussion. But it was some time before
they bore fruit.
The next occasion on which the Court took a considerable step in what
proved to be the new direction, there was no specific statutory provision,
but a much tighter legal argument was available even under the Indian
gift theory of trust taxation. This was the case of Douglas v. Willcuts, 37 in
which the Court held that the income of a trust entered into to pay ali-
mony to the settlor's divorced wife was taxable to the settlor. After noting
that under the law of the state in which the divorce took place a lump sum
settlement did not operate and could not operate to deprive the divorce
court of its continuing jurisdiction to award alimony and that under the
precedents in the United States Supreme Court amounts paid to a di-
vorced wife under an alimony decree were regarded as income to the
husband but not as income to the wife, the Court concluded that the situa-
tion here was one under which payments were made to discharge a legal
obligation of the husband and were in effect income to the husband. The
Court said in part:
The creation of a trust by the taxpayer as the channel for the application of the in-
come to the discharge of his obligation leaves the nature of the transaction unaltered.
Burnet v. Wells, supra. In the present case, the net income of the trust fund, which was
35 Ibid., at 681-82.
36 While there may be situations in which the retention of insurance on the life of the bread-
winner is "a pressing social duty," such was hardly the case with Frederick B. Wells, who had
an income of around $i5o,ooo a year and could fund an insurance trust to meet annual premi-
ums of about $17,ooo. Frederick B. Wells, i9 B.T.A. 1213 (193o).
37 296 U.S. 1 (I935).
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paid to the wife under the decree, stands substantially on the same footing as though
he had received the income personally and had been required by the decree to make
the payment directly.
We do not regard the provisions of the statutes as to the taxation of trusts, fidu-
ciaries and beneficiaries (Revenue Acts, 1926, §§ 2, 219; 1928, §§ 16i, 162), as intended
to apply to cases where the income of the trust would otherwise remain, by virtue of
the nature and purpose of the trust, attributable to the creator of the trust and ac-
cordingly taxable to him. These provisions have appropriate reference to cases
where the income of the trust is no longer to be regarded as that of the settlor, and we
find no warrant for a construction which would preclude the laying of the tax against
the one who through the discharge of his obligation enjoys the benefit of the income
as though he had personally received it.38
The second of these paragraphs in retrospect seems particularly sig-
nificant. ,.
This case, read with Burnet v. Wells, looked as though it might be the
opening wedge of an extremely broad doctrine operating to destroy the
income advantages of most private trusts. However, the principle of
Douglas v. Willcuts has been restricted fairly closely to cases of trust in-
come used to meet legally enforceable, though not necessarily liquidated,
obligations of the settlor.' 9 In the recent cases of Helvering v. Fuller4° and
Helvering v. Leonard4' the divorced husband's continuing obligation for
support has been made the test of taxability of alimony trusts, so that
where the establishment of the trust completely and permanently dis-
charges the obligation of the divorced husband the income from the trust
is no longer taxable to the grantor but is taxable to the divorced wife.42
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held, in
Corn'r v. Mest, 43 that the husband's transfer of assets in a lump-sum ali-
mony settlement is in effect a sale or exchange of these assets in considera-
tion of the surrender of the wife's right of support so that on such a trans-
fer a capital gain may be realized.
If the cases described above were straws in the wind, the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court last year in Helvering v. Clifford,44 Helvering
v. Horst,45 and Helvering v. Eubank46 are storm warnings. The Clifford case
involved the controversy which the Treasury Department had been push-
s
8 Ibid., at 9-io.
39 E.g., Schweitzer v. Com'r, 75 F. (2d) 702 (C.C.A. 7 th 1935), rev'd per curiam sub nom.
Helvering v. Schweitzer, 396 U.S. 551 (I935).
40 3io U.S. 69 (I94O). 4131o U.S. 80 (1940).
42 Pearce v. Com'r, 62 S.Ct. 754 (1942).
43 123 F. (2d) 986 (C.C.A. 3d 1941), noted in 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 525 (1942).
44309 U.S. 331 (1940). 453I U.S. 112 (1941). 46311 U.S. 122 (1941).
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ing for a number of years concerning the income tax status of the short
term trust. Although the income tax law provides that the grantor may
be taxed on the income of a trust where he retains the power to revest in
himself title to any part of the corpus, this language is not directly appli-
cable to a trust entirely irrevocable but so drawn that by its own terms it
will end after a rather short period of time, where the property will return
to the grantor but not by reason of any power retained by him. The courts
have consistently held, up to and including the case of Helvering v. Woody7
that the statutory language of Sections 166 and 167 does not cover short
term trusts and the Treasury Department had tried without success to
obtain a new clause specifically taxing such trusts. In the Clifford case,
however, Government counsel offered a different argument. They con-
tended that irrespective of any language or significant lack of language in
the sections dealing expressly with trusts, Section 22, which merely defines
gross income, was sufficiently broad to include in the income of a settlor
the income of a trust which under the circumstances might be regarded as
too nearly illusory to justify tax recognition. In the Clifford case the trust
by its terms was to expire in five years. The settlor was himself the trustee
and reserved all powers of management and control. The sole beneficiary
was the settlor's wife. It was not contended that tax savings were the sole
consideration involved in the settlor's decision to set up this trust, that
there was any restriction placed on the beneficiary's use of the trust in-
come, or that the trust was designed to relieve the taxpayer from liability
for family or household expenses. Nevertheless, the income was held tax-
able to the settlor. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, said in
part:
In this case we cannot conclude as a matter of law that respondent ceased to be the
owner of the corpus after the trust was created. Rather, the short duration of the
trusts, the fact that the wife was the beneficiary, and the retention of control over the
corpus by respondent all lead irresistibly to the conclusion that respondent continued
to be the owner for purposes of § 22(a).
So far as his dominion and control were concerned it seems clear that the trust did
not effect any substantial change. In substance his control over the corpus was in all
essential respects the same after the trust was created, as before. The wide powers
which he retained included for all practical purposes most of the control which he as an
individual would have. There were, we may assume, exceptions, such as his disability
to make a gift of the corpus to others during the term of the trust and to make loans
to himself. But this dilution in his control would seem to be insignificant and imma-
terial, since control over investment remained. If it be said that such control is the
type of dominion exercised by any trustee, the answer is simple. We have at best a
temporary reallocation of income within an intimate family group. Since the income
47309 U.S. 344 (194o).
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remains in the family and since the husband retains control over the investment, he
has rather complete assurance that the trust will not effect any substantial change in
his economic position. It is hard to imagine that respondent felt himself the poorer
after this trust had been executed or, if h~e did, that it had any rational foundation in
fact. For as a result of the terms of the trust and the intimacy of the familial rela-
tionship respondent retained the substance of full enjoyment of all the rights which
previously he had in the property. That might not be true if only strictly legal rights
were considered. But when the benefits flowing to him indirectly through the wife
are added to the legal rights he retained, the aggregate may be said to be a fair equiva-
lent of what he previously had. To exclude from the aggregate those indirect bene-
fits would be to deprive § 22(a) of considerable vitality and to treat as immaterial
what may be highly relevant considerations in the creation of such family trusts.
For where the head of the household has income in excess of normal needs, it may well
make but little difference to him (except income-tax-wise) where portions of that in-
come are routed-so long as it stays in the family group. In those circumstances the
all-important factor might be retention by him of control over the principal. With that
control in his hands he would keep direct command over all that he needed to remain
in substantially the same financial situation as before. Our point here is that no one fact
is normally decisive but that all considerations and circumstances of the kind we have
mentioned are relevant to the question of ownership and are appropriate foundations
for findings on that issue. Thus, where, as in this case, the benefits directly or indirectly
retained blend so imperceptibly with the normal concepts of full ownership, we cannot
say that the triers of fact committed reversible error when they found that the hus-
band was the owner of the corpus for the purposes of § 22(a). To hold otherwise would
be to treat the wife as a complete stranger; to let mere formalism obscure the normal
consequences of family solidarity; and to force concepts of ownership to be fashioned
out of legal niceties which may have little or no significance in such household arrange-
ments.48
Then, after stating that the mere existence of Sections 166 and 16749 did
not operate to exclude this trust from the more general language of Section
22, the Court said:
In view of this result we need not examine the contention that the trust device falls
within the rule of Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. iii, and Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136,
relating to the assignment of future income; or that respondent is liable under § 166,
taxing grantors on the income of revocable trusts.so
The result of this case has been criticized on two grounds. It certainly
constituted a bold stroke of legislation, which some do not consider the
proper function of the Court. The existence in the statute of specific and
detailed provisions for the taxation of trusts, coupled with the failure of
Congress on request to add to those provisions another which would cover
48 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335-37 (1940).
49 Section i6r(b), which provides that "the tax shall be computed upon the net income of
the estate or trust, and shall be paid by the fiduciary, except as provided in § 166 (relating to
revocable trusts) and § 167 (relating to income for benefit of the grantor)," was not mentioned
by the Court.
so Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 338 (i94o).
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this situation, must make it reasonably clear that the "broad and sweep-
ing language of Section 22(a)" was not regarded by the legislature as ap-
plicable to such a situation as this. Moreover the result of this case was to
leave the situation for the future extremely obscure. In the majority of all
private trusts you will find at least one of the three factors relied upon by
Mr. justice Douglas and in many of them you will find two. By carefully
refraining from indicating on what factor he placed his primary reliance
and as well by the somewhat obscure suggestion that the trust device gen-
erally may fall within the rule of Lucas v. Earl,' the Court, evidently
intentionally, broadened the area of uncertainty in the taxability of
trusts.Y
Helvering v. Hors5s and Helvering v. Eubank 4 made a further substantial
contribution to uncertainty in this field. In the Horst case the owner of
bonds clipped coupons shortly before they were due and gave these
coupons to his son. The Court held that the coupons when paid were in-
come to the father as owner of the bonds. The father's position in the case
appeared technically impregnable. He had disposed of his severable prop-
erty right in the coupons before payment was due and the payment went
to his son as owner of the property. Nevertheless the majority of the
Court held in favor of the commissioner, and much of the language- in
Mr. justice Stone's opinion could justify an extremely broad interpreta-,
tion. After citing and to some extent discussing Burnet v. Wells, Douglas v.
Willcuts, Helvering v. Clifford, and other cases, the Court said:
Underlying the reasoning in these cases is the thought that income is "realized"
by the assignor because he, who owns or controls the source of the income, also con-
trols the disposition of that which he could have received himself and diverts the pay-
ment from himself to others as the means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants.
The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment and obtained
the satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and uses the income to procure those
satisfactions, or whether he disposes of his right to collect it as the means of procuring
them. Cf. Burnet v. Wells, supra.
Although the donor here, by the transfer of the coupons, has precluded any possi-
bility of his collecting them himself, he has nevertheless, by his act, procured payment
of the interest as a valuable gift to a member of his family. Such a use of his economic
gain, the right to receive income, to procure a satisfaction which can be obtained only
by the expenditure of money or property, would seem to be the enjoyment of the in-
come whether the satisfaction is the purchase of goods at the corner grocery, the pay-
5Z Under this rule future earnings cannot be assigned so as to exclude them from the taxable
income of the party earning them.
52 This is not necessarily a criticism. Some doubt as to the exact location of the line between
taxability and tax avoidance, like the vague definition of "fraud," may discourage those who
habitually cut as close as possible to a known line between the legal and the illegal.
S3311 U.S. 112 (1941). 54 ,x3 U.S. 122 (i94I).
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ment of his debt there, or such non-material satisfactions as may result from the pay-
ment of a campaign or community chest contribution, or a gift to his favorite son. 5
It was true in the Horst case and stated in the-first paragraph of Mr.
Justice Stone's opinion that the interest coupons were detached from the
bonds, delivered to the donee, and paid at maturity all within the same
year. However, Helvering v. Eubank involved a life insurance agent who in
1924 and in 1928 made voluntary assignments of his future right to collect
renewal commissions on insurance already sold by him, no further act
being necessary by the assignor to secure the right to these commissions.
The Court held that renewal commissions paid to the assignees in 1933
constituted part of the assignor's taxable income for that year, saying,
"this is a companion case to Helvering v. Horst .... and presents issues
not distinguishable from those in that case."' 6
The cases of Helvering v. Horst, Helvering v. Eubank, Helvering v. Clif-
ford, and Burnet v. Wells, taken together, justify a rule totally destroying
the income tax advantages of any family trust by taxing all trust income
to the settlor as long as he lives. In determining either to whom the in-
come should be paid or whether it should be accumulated, every trust
involves "a continuing exercise by the settlor of a power to direct the
application of the income along pre-determined channels." In every such
case the donor, by the creation of the trust, may have precluded any
possibility of collecting the trust income himself but "nevertheless, by his
act, procured payment of the interest as a valuable gift to a member of
his family," and thus used his right to receive income "to procure a
satisfaction which can be obtained only by the expenditure of money or
property." If the existence of Sections 161-67 does not operate, even by
interpretation, to narrow the scope of Section 22 as applied to trust in-
come there is no obvious place to draw the line short of taxing the income
of all family trusts to the settlor during his life.
What are the warnings which should be drawn for one who is supervis-
ing the disposal of property today? Obviously the draftsman of a trust is
walking on quicksand and it is no guarantee of a satisfactory future that
an instrument drawn today is within the actual holding of cases already
decided. At the very least a settlor should wholly and completely sur-
render control, saving to himself no reversionary interest or possibility of
reverter, no power to alter or amend, no hope of enjoyment, nor even the
non-beneficial but practically useful control of a trustee. Even though all
this is done no one can safely guarantee that the trust will result in tax
savings in the future. It might even result in the aggravation of tax bur-
ss Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. X12, ix6-I7 (1941).
S6 Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 124 (1941).
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dens. Quite apart from the possible activities of Congress, the cases of the
last few years indicate a real possibility that the income of all family trusts
may in the near future be held taxable to the grantor during his lifetime.
A less radical step in judicial legislation would be to tax to the grantor the
income of all trusts for accumulation, on the ground that here we have the
clearest instance of the "direction of the application of income along pre-
determined channels."57 But it is hard to say why the Horst and Eubank
cases do not justify taxation to the grantor even where the income is cur-
rently distributed to the beneficiaries. It may be objected, and probably
with reason, that the Court could not go quite this far since such action in
every case would constitute not merely a judicial addition to Section 22
but judicial repeal of Section i6i.58 However, the existence of Section i61
did not prevent the result of the Cliford case and the Court there de-
liberately refrained from putting any definite limitation on the scope of its
decision.
In the estate tax field Congress has already gone a trifle farther than
under the income tax in disregarding inter vivos trusts in the computation
of taxable estates. However, there is nothing to prevent the Court from
reconsidering United States v. Wells and coming to the conclusion that all
transfers in trust which serve substantially the same purposes as testa-
mentary dispositions (although they may have other motivations as well)
should be treated as transfers "in contemplation of death." Moreover,
there are two simple changes which Congress might make in the present
laws largely to destroy both the income tax and estate tax advantages of
inter vivos trusts as against outright gifts or testamentary disposition.
One of these would be to apply a prohibitive rate of income tax to the
accumulated income of trusts; the other would be to combine the present
estate and gift taxes in a single tax on gratuitous transfers or receipts.s9
What then does wisdom counsel in the creation of trusts today? The
only wise advice today is to create no trusts unless two or three years' in-
come tax savings and the chance, far from guaranteed, of further savings
at the settlor's death are regarded as worth any disadvantages which
might follow from the establishment of irreversible property settlements
to tie the hands of the donor in the future.
57 A line drawn at this point would make practical good sense. It is only as to accumulated
income that the trust offers substantial income tax advantage over outright gifts of capital. So
long as reduction of family income is permitted by division of capital among the members,
there is no obvious reason for penalizing trusts as against outright transfers save in the case
where the grantor has attempted to preserve the substance of his wealth while transferring the
tax liability to another. See the discussion at pages 43o-31 supra.
s8 Note 49 supra.
s9 See James, Irascible Comments on the Revenue Laws, 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 58 (1941).
